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Scholars have widely used the enlargement process as a foil for as-
sessing both the nature and the potential influence of the ENP. In 
this paper, I attempt to show that the ENP-enlargement comparison 
is flawed by the fact that the two policies pursue different finalité – 
association and integration respectively. The paper then privileges 
the comparison with the Euro-Mediterranean policy. Drawing on 
the ENP-EMP comparison, the paper argues that the ENP marks 
the shift away from policy-change to policy-level. Two implications 
are drawn from this finding. The first is substantive in that it points 
to a pragmatic international role for the EU. The second is meth-
odological in that I argue that adopting an IPE approach to the 
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1.  Introduction  
 
In March 2003, the European Commission went public with an ini-
tiative – which is now well-known as the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) – whose aim is the creation of a “friendly neighbour-
hood”.  That  is,  the  ENP  aims  at  establishing  “an  area  of  shared 
prosperity and values based on deeper economic integration, inten-
sified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-border coop-
eration and shared responsibility for conflict prevention between the 
EU and its neighbours” (Commission 2003: 9). The rationale be-
hind the initiative is clearly rooted in the enlargement process. In-
deed, the ENP official documents spell out the link between the ac-
cession of new members and the need to strengthen EU-neighbours 
relationship. 
 
The close connection between the ENP and the EU enlargement – 
whereas the former is a sort of outcome of the latter – has pushed 
the most part of commentators to analyse the neighbourhood policy 
against the model of the enlargement policy. The ENP-enlargement 
comparison has led to some interesting insights. For instance, it has 
allowed  scholars  to  appreciate  the  decisive  influence  of  DG 
enlargement officials in drafting the new policy (Kelley 2006) or to 
investigate the ambiguity of EU identity (Smith 2005). Nevertheless, 
the comparison is problematic in two respects. First, the comparison 
is based on a mistaken understanding of the finalité of the two ini-
tiatives. Whereas the enlargement pursues the objective of integrat-
ing other states into the Union, the ENP pursues the objective of as-
sociating and stabilizing partner states (Missiroli 2003). Second, not 
only is the comparison with the enlargement analytically question-
able. The policy implications drawn from the comparison are prob-
lematic either. Indeed, a number of scholars have argued that the 
new policy is unlikely to work because of the lack of the member-
ship incentive – the ‘insufficient incentives’ argument. Nevertheless, 
as I show at greater length below, there is no strong evidence to 
lend support to this argument. 
 
Moving from the ENP-enlargement comparison, in this paper, I sin-
gle out the main features of the neighbourhood policy by way of 
comparison with another neighbourhood policy, namely the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). By doing so, I argue that we can 158  European Political Economy Review  
   
better appreciate the elements of continuities/discontinuities in the 
relationship between the EU and its neighbours and we can better 
assess the implications of a policy designed to associate and not to 
integrate. 
 
Sketching the ENP-EMP comparison, I draw attention to the princi-
ple of differentiation that appears in the documents of the ENP but 
it does not in those of the EMP. Furthermore, borrowing from the 
debate on international financial institutions’ (IFIs) conditionality, I 
argue that the ENP marks the shift from the logic of policy-change, 
according to which EU-neighbours relationship is a function of pol-
icy changes implemented by the neighbour country, to the logic of 
policy-level, according to which the level of institutional and politi-
cal capacity of the neighbour country shapes the nature of its rela-
tionship with the EU. Two implications are drawn from my argu-
ment. The first is a reassessment of the ‘insufficient incentives’ ar-
gument. I critically engage with the argument that the ENP’s lack of 
membership  seriously  impairs  the  potential  influence  of  the 
neighbourhood policy. Second, I suggest that adopting a political 
economy approach to the study of the ENP may help take in due 
consideration  the  complex  interrelationship  between  international 
and domestic variables that shape the extent of EU’s influence over 
its partners. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I review the 
literature on the ENP – the way in which scholars have used the 
enlargement to identify the main features of the ENP and to assess 
its  potential  effectiveness.  After  having  questioned  the  ENP-
enlargement comparison, in the third section, I introduce the EMP 
and I proceed by comparison to the analysis of the ENP. In particu-
lar, special attention is devoted to the principle of differentiation 
and the shift from policy-change to policy-level. In the fourth sec-
tion, I elaborate on the two implications that follow from the analy-
sis of the EMP-ENP comparison. Section five concludes.  
 
 
2.  Studying the ENP at the shadow of enlargement  
 
The  launch  of  the  ENP  has  catalysed  considerable  scholars’  and 
practitioners’  attention.  Being  inscribed  in  the  wider  context  of Moschella: An IPE Approach to the Neighbourhood Policy  159 
European Foreign Policy (EFP), the study of the ENP has mainly 
been informed by two sets of questions. The first set of questions 
investigates the rationale behind the choice to open EU frontiers to 
cross-border flows of goods, service, capital, and people. Openness 
is the dependent variable and a range of explanatory factors have 
been suggested to account for it. For instance, from the EU Com-
mission’s functionalist perspective, ‘interdependence’ between the 
EU and its neighbours justifies closer cooperation. Scholars with a 
realist bent argue that openness is a function of power politics in 
that the EU shapes “its ‘near abroad’ in ways amenable to the long-
term strategic and economic interests of its member states” (Hyde-
Price 2006: 226-227). Finally, constructivists emphasise the impor-
tance of norms and role conceptions to make sense of EU relation-
ship with its neighbourhood (Del Sarto 2006).
1 
 
The second set of questions investigates the relative weight of fac-
tors that have contributed to shape the neighbourhood policy. Here, 
the ENP policy is the dependent variable – the outcome to be ex-
plained. Drawing on this governance approach, the ENP has been 
explained through factors as new member states’ influence in draft-
ing the policy (Lynch 2003); “perceptions of interdependence and 
institutional roles and capacities” (Lavenex 2004: 681); EU institu-
tional actors and EU past experiences / policies (Kelley 2006). One 
of the common features of this literature is that most of these con-
tributions implicitly or explicitly rely on the comparison with the 
enlargement policy to draw conclusions both about the nature of the 
ENP and about its potential effects. That is, the enlargement process 
is regarded as the reference point, the standard, against which to as-
sess the policy and its potential achievements. For instance, “there 
is  clearly  optimism  that  the  better  reference  point  for  the  new 
neighbourhood policy will be enlargement and not the past plethora 
of other EU democracy promotion efforts” (Kelley 2006: 41). 
 
However, I found the comparison between the neighbourhood and 
the enlargement policy  problematic and, in the consequences de-
rived from it, even mistaken. The problem with this comparison lies 
                                                 
1 For warrant of space, the literature presented here is necessarily selective and 
simplified. In particular, it does not do justice of more nuanced and sophisticated 
accounts available in the literature 160  European Political Economy Review  
   
in the fact that it overlooks a crucial difference between the two 
policies. Whereas the enlargement’s goal is integration with the Un-
ion, the neighbourhood’s goal is association with the Union. Spe-
cifically, the latter aims at “fostering regional cooperation and broad 
partnerships”  while  the  former  aims  at  “bringing  neighbourhood 
countries into the EU through a bilateral approach based on strict 
conditionality” (Missiroli 2003: 10). 
 
That the ENP does not pursue integration has led some scholars to 
label  the  ENP  as  an  “exclusionary”  policy  (Bretherton,  Vogler 
2006). A normative assessment of the ENP goes beyond the scope 
of this article. What is worth stressing here, though, is that a differ-
ent logic underlies the two policies thus rendering the comparison 
questionable. This is especially evident if we review the main im-
plication drawn from the ENP-enlargement comparison about the 
potential effectiveness of the ENP,
2 specifically, the argument that 
the ENP lacks sufficient, appropriate, incentives to promote change 
in the domestic political and economic systems of its neighbours 
(Balfour, Rotta 2005; Del Sarto, Schumacher 2005; Grabbe 2004; 
Lavenex 2004; Tocci 2005).
3 Indeed, a closer look at the ‘insuffi-
cient incentives’ argument reveals that such scepticism is vitiated 
by the comparison with the enlargement policy.  
 
For instance, Kelley’s (2006) explanation of why ENP incentives 
are insufficient – especially in fostering human rights and democ-
racy – is clearly modelled on the enlargement experience in that the 
author posits that ENP countries start from lower levels as com-
pared to 1993 accession countries. In a similar vein, Karen Smith 
(2005) posits that the ENP is not likely to solve EU problems with 
its  neighbours  because,  among  other  reasons,  the  ENP  does  not 
                                                 
2 The term “effectiveness” is problematic on its own. In particular, an empirical 
measure of what effectiveness implies is a matter of debate (Levy, Young, Zürn 
1995). Without entering into the theoretical debate, in this paper, I am going to 
use terms such as EU effectiveness or influence simply to indicate the range of 
domestic transformations that occur in the partner countries and that can be asso-
ciated with EU leverage and incentives. 
3  The incentives offered in the ENP include: the offer of integration into the EU’s 
Internal Market; an intensified political cooperation; reduction of trade barriers 
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eliminate the “ghost” of enlargement. The upshot of these consid-
erations is that lacking membership the ENP is unlikely to work. 
 
The problem in these arguments is that they apply the logic of inte-
gration that underlies the enlargement experience to a different con-
text, forcing the insights drawn from the enlargement experience. If 
it is widely recognized that “The EU’s most effective conditionality 
tool so far has been access to candidate status” (Grabbe 2002: 256), 
this insight has been widely elaborated and tested for countries in-
volved in accession negotiations. I mean that this insight tells us 
that, weighting different incentives offered during the enlargement 
negotiations, membership – and not “aid, trade, and other benefits” 
(Grabbe 2002: 256) – carries the most causal explanatory value. Ex-
tending this insight to countries that are not offered the same range 
of incentives, however, may be misleading.  
 
Hence, underestimating the different finalité of the two policies is 
not  only  analytically  questionable.  The  empirical  implications 
drawn  from  it  –  i.e.  the  “insufficient  incentive”  argument  –  are 
problematic either. Sticking to the comparison with the enlargement, 
indeed,  obscures  the  operation  of  mechanisms  different  from  the 
“strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides 
external incentives for a target government to comply with its con-
ditions” (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004: 662). In order to ap-
preciate and identify these different mechanisms at play in the ENP, 
in  what  follows  I  propose  to  compare  the  neighbourhood  policy 
with a European policy with which the ENP shares the same fi-
nalité: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Focusing on the 
ENP-EMP comparison, I bring into sharp relief the innovative fea-
tures of the ENP, such as the principle of differentiation, and their 
bearings on the transformative influence of the EU in its neighbour-
hood.  
 
It is worth stressing at this point that the principle of differentiation 
was not totally absent in the EU enlargement policy – in contrast, it 
was incorporated into the enlargement toolkit to complement its ap-
proach based on conditionality.
4 Nevertheless, even if the principle 
                                                 
4 I thank Laure Delcour and Elsa Tulmets for having drawn my attention to the 
influence of the enlargement legacy on the ENP. 162  European Political Economy Review  
   
of differentiation is coloured by previous policy ideas and instru-
ments, the salience attributed to it in the ENP calls for moving be-
yond  the  theoretical  and  empirical  insights  drawn  from  the 
enlargement experience (Tulmets, 2006). 
 
 
3.  The  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  and  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
 
What are the main features of the European Neighbourhood policy 
as compared to a similar neighbourhood policy, that is, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership? The two policies are similar in impor-
tant  respects.  Both  policies  aim  at  creating  a  zone  of  peace  and 
prosperity that include the Union and its partners. Both initiatives 
adopt a similar set of incentives that place the greatest emphasis on 
political dialogue, trade, and technical cooperation. The EU Com-
mission’s treatment of the interaction between the two policies fur-
ther reveals the similarities between the two. Keeping in mind that 
the ENP followed the EMP and that the latter is more limited in 
geographical scope than its ENP counterpart, the Commission has 
clearly stated that the ENP does not replace the EMP. Rather, the 
two policies complement each other.
5 
 
Despite the similarities, the two initiatives differ in an important re-
spect. The Euro-Med policy is informed by the notion of regional-
ism which is not replicated in the ENP. While the EMP emphasises 
“multilateralism” as the “prevalent” approach (Commission 2000: 
15),  which  is  also  reflected  in  the  EMP  multilateral  fora,  the 
neighbourhood policy emphasises the principle of differentiation – 
according to which the level of cooperation and association with the 
Union is a function of bilateral relationships between the Union and 
each  neighbour.  Before  thoroughly  investigating  the  functioning 
and the implication of the principle of differentiation, an exposition 
of moderate length is required to bring into sharp relief the features 
of the EMP-ENP. 
 
                                                 
5 An analysis of the consequences for the Euro-Med Partnership that derive from 
the adoption of the ENP is beyond the scope of this article. For an assessment see 
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3.1  The principle of differentiation. Shifting from Policy Change 
to Policy Level  
 
The EU and the Mediterranean  
 
The  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  was  launched  in  November 
1995 when the Union and 12 Mediterranean countries signed the 
Barcelona  Declaration  (for  the  origins  of  the  EMP,  see  Bicchi 
2003).
6 The aim of the initiative was to establish “an area of dia-
logue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and 
prosperity”  (Barcelona  Declaration  1995).  While  the  Declaration 
details the principles and objectives of the Euro-Med Partnership, 
the  annexed  work  programme  details  the  instruments  –  bilateral, 
“regional and multilateral actions” –  through which the Declaration 
is going to be implemented. Furthermore, three areas of cooperation 
are identified (1) a political and security partnership; (2) an eco-
nomic and financial partnership; (3) a partnership in social, cultural 
and human affairs. 
 
A number of scholars have drawn attention to the distinctive fea-
tures of the EMP (see, for instance, the contributions in Gillespie 
1997). Some scholars have drawn attention to the complementarity 
among  the  three  pillars  that  constitute  the  partnership  (Philippart 
2003). Others have focused on a specific pillar (Schumacher 2005). 
For the purpose of my analysis, however, I am going to concentrate 
on  a  specific  feature  of  the  EMP, that  is,  its  regional  dimension 
(Adler 1998: 189; Attinà 2003). 
 
Indeed, the principles of the Barcelona Declaration place the em-
phasis on a “multilateral framework” as the mechanism that com-
plements the bilateral relationship between the EU and each Medi-
terranean  partner  –  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Association  Agree-
ments.
7 The latter are inscribed within the multilateral framework 
                                                 
6 Two of the original partners – Cyprus and Malta – are now EU members. The 
10 Mediterranean partners are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Libya has observer status since 
1999. 
7 By October 2004, after the conclusion of the Agreement with Syria, the grid of 
the Euro-Med agreements has been completed. An overview of these agreements 164  European Political Economy Review  
   
provided by the EMP. In sum, the bilateral dimension is an integral 
part of the regional dimension set forth in the Barcelona Declaration. 
This is evident in the institutional configuration of the Partnership 
where specific bodies have been set as a guarantee of the initiative’s 
regional dimension. 
 
According to the official EU website, the Euro-Mediterranean Com-
mittee for the Barcelona Process was set up to serve as “an overall 
steering body for the regional process”.
8 The committee, which is 
chaired by the EU Presidency, consists of the EU Member States, 
Mediterranean Partners, and European Commission representatives. 
Participation of a representative from each partner country is also 
assured in the Euro-Mediterranean conferences that take place at the 
level of Foreign Ministers, sectoral Ministers, experts, and represen-
tatives of civil society. The institutional scheme of the EMP also in-
cludes the periodical meetings among European and Mediterranean 
ministers, and the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, es-
tablished  in  December  2003  (for  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  the 
EMP institutional framework, see Philippart 2003). 
 
Turning to the analysis of the ENP, it is possible to detect a sort of 
decoupling between the regional and the bilateral dimension that 
has marked the EU Mediterranean experience. The ENP does not 
mandate  the  creation  of  regional  bodies  (Smith  2005:  772).  Fur-
thermore, its logic of functioning is different. Let us turn then to the 
European neighbourhood policy to substantiate this point. 
 
The EU and  the neighbourhood: differentiation and policy-level 
 
The content of the ENP has been made public in March 2003 with 
the  release  of  the  Communication  “Wider  Europe”  (Commission 
2003).
9 In this document, the Commission provides the first details 
of a policy whose aim is “to work with the partners to reduce pov-
erty and create an area of shared prosperity and values based on 
                                                                                                               
is  available  from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/med_ass_agreemnts.htm  
8 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/multilateral_relations.htm  
9 ENP partners are Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, 
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deeper economic integration, intensified political and cultural rela-
tions, enhanced cross-border cooperation and shared responsibility 




Keeping the EMP in mind, the overall goal of the ENP does not 
significantly  differ  from  the  previous  Mediterranean  Partnership. 
Both  initiatives  privilege  a  complementary  approach  that  encom-
passes political, economic, and cultural cooperation. Turning to the 
means through which these goals should be attained no significant 
difference emerge either. Political dialogue and economic coopera-
tion constitute the building blocks of the relationship between the 
Union and its partners in both initiatives. Countries are encouraged 
to sign bilateral agreements with the Union (i.e. Action Plans) that 
specify the content and the extent of the relationship with the EU, in 
a similar way as the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
do. 
 
Despite the similarities, a closer inspection reveals an important dif-
ference  between  the  ENP  and  the  EMP.  This  difference  pertains 
neither to the overall goals pursued by the two policies nor to the 
means used to attain those goals. Rather, the difference regards the 
logic of functioning that lies behind the neighbourhood policy. This 
difference is embodied in the principle of differentiation.
11  
 
A reading of the ENP documents shows that the EU Commission 
recognizes that its neighbourhood is made up of “different coun-
tries”. Some countries are already longstanding  partners (e.g. the 
Mediterranean countries). Others enjoy less developed channels of 
                                                 
10 Since March 2003, a considerable number of EU Commission communications, 
EU Council conclusions, and Action Plans signed with neighbouring countries 
have refined the content of the ENP. Among the changes introduced over time, it 
is worth mentioning the extension of the ENP to the Caucuses countries (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia) and the adjustment of the set of incentives offered to 
the  neighbours  –  with  the  drop  of  the  offer  of  the  free  movement  of  people 
(Commission 2004). 
11 For warrant of space, another interesting difference will not be analysed here – 
i.e. the more active role the Union claims for itself in preventing and solving con-
flicts in the neighbourhood as compared to its role in the EMP. For the treatment 
of the issue see Moschella (2004) and Schumacher (2004). 166  European Political Economy Review  
   
cooperation  with  the  Union.  Furthermore,  income  differences,  as 
well as other general economic differences, across the neighbour-
hood are noticeably acknowledged.
12 Drawing on these premises, 
the Commission draws the logic of functioning of the neighbour-
hood policy as follows: 
 
“While the EU should aim to ensure a more coherent approach, offering 
the same opportunities across the wider neighbourhood, and asking in re-
turn the same standards of behaviour from each of our neighbours, differ-
entiation  between  countries  would  remain  the  basis  for  the  new 
neighbourhood policy. The overall goal will be to work with partner coun-
tries to foster the political and economic reform process, promote closer 
economic integration and sustainable development and provide political 
support and assistance” (Commission 2003: 16) 
 
What does exactly the principle of differentiation entail? The prin-
ciple of differentiation claims that each partner decides the degree 
of association with the Union based on its institutional and political 
capabilities. This principle will be implemented by means of Action 
Plans – i.e. political documents that detail the overarching strategic 
policy  targets  negotiated  between  the  Union  and  each  partner. 
Based  on  hub-and-spoke  relationships  (Emerson  2003),  the  ENP 
has  been  redefined  as  “a  policy  for  neighbours  rather  than  a 
neighbourhood policy” (Smith 2005: 771). 
 
The ENP documents further specify the mechanism through which 
the process of economic association with the EU will operate.  
 
“In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective 
implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including 
in aligning legislation  with the acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood should 
benefit  from  the  prospect  of  closer  economic  integration  with  the  EU” 
(Commission 2003: 4).  
 
The language here appears to point to the mechanism of the “strat-
egy  of  reinforcement  by  reward”  (Schimmelfennig,  Sedelmeier 
2004). Nevertheless, a closer inspection reveals a different mecha-
nism. Specifically, it is the mechanism of the conditionality of pol-
                                                 
12 This is not to say that the Union was previously unaware of these differences. 
The point I am making here is that such awareness has produced a different logic 
in the ENP. Moschella: An IPE Approach to the Neighbourhood Policy  167 
icy-level – aid is conditional upon the level of each partners’ institu-
tional and political capacity – and not the conditionality of policy-
change – aid is provided on the condition to change a set of domes-
tic policies (Collier 2000). In other words, the nature and scope of 
the relationship between the EU and its partners is not conditional 
upon the ultimate achievement of specific reforms. Rather, the con-
tent of the relationship is made conditional upon the level of institu-
tional and political capacity of each partner thereby suggesting “a 
policy with variable geometry” (Tulmets 2006). 
 
The words partnership and national ownership, then, are put front 
and centre. “The EU […] should stand ready to work in close part-
nership with the neighbouring countries who wish to implement fur-
ther reforms and assist in building their capacity to align with and 
implement parts of the acquis communautaire” (Commission 2003: 
10) The EU Commission (2003: 16) also carefully distinguishes the 
process of monitoring the benchmarks included in the Action Plans 
from “ ‘traditional’ conditionality […], in order to ensure national 
ownership and commitment”. Furthermore, the strategy paper re-
leased in 2004 states that: “[T]he EU does not seek to impose priori-
ties or conditions on its partners” (Commission 2004: 8). 
 
The principle of differentiation thus marks the shift away from con-
ditionality, which is the conventional feature in many instances of 
EU’s external relationships (Smith 1998), to partnership. This shift 
has deepened over time. Comparing the EU Commission documents 
in 2003 and 2004, for instance, Kelley (2006: 36) notes that, “while 
the Commission’s ‘Wider Europe’ communication [2003] used the 
word ‘benchmark’ or ‘target’ 14 times, sometimes in bold typeface, 
the strategy paper [2004] uses each of these words only once, but 
mentions ‘incentive’, a softer concept, more frequently”.  
 
 
4.  The policy implications of the ENP 
 
Is the ENP likely to work? This is one of the most debated issues 
about the ENP. As I said in the first section, however, this question 
is usually posed against the model of the enlargement process. In 
other words, the complete version of the above question reads, Is 
the ENP likely to work in the absence of membership incentive? 168  European Political Economy Review  
   
Since I have already pointed to the flaws inherent in the comparison 
between the ENP and enlargement, I am not going to assess the im-
plications of the lack of membership for a policy in which member-
ship  is  not  officially  at  stake.  Rather,  after  having  identified  the 
main features of the ENP, and in order to assess the policy for what 
it is and not for what it should be, I am more interested here to as-
sess the implications of the ENP’s extant features. Specifically, I am 
interested in investigating the potentials of the logic of differentia-
tion in inducing policy changes.  
 
4.1  Is differentiation likely to work?  
 
A premise is important here. The results of the ENP are not  yet 
available – the ENP is a relatively new policy and it will take a cou-
ple of years to assess the impact of the Action Plans in the domestic 
policies of the neighbouring countries. In order to assess the poten-
tial impact of the ENP, I find expedient to proceed by comparison. 
As a starting point, I will thereby proceed on the track of the com-
parison with the EMP. 
 
What  lessons  can  we  draw  from  the  experience  of  the  Euro-
Mediterranean partnership that are relevant to the ENP? In terms of 
policy changes, the record is mixed in some areas (for an assess-
ment of the economic partnership Nsouli 2006; for a more general 
assessment Philippart 2003; Schumacher 2004) and limited in oth-
ers – the area of human rights and democracy is a case in point 
(Biscop 2005; Gillespie, Youngs 2002). Karen Smith (2005: 770) 
critically notes that “around the Mediterranean, the EU’s attempts to 
influence politics seem […] ineffectual”. Among other factors, she 
points to the non-application of political conditionality to account 
for the limited effect of EU influence in the region. We could guess 
that had conditionality been applied, EU influence would have been 
greater. The problem, however, is that the EU has been traditionally 
reluctant to apply conditionality. Karen Smith (1998) herself identi-
fies a number of reasons for EU reluctance. For instance, the use of 
conditionality has been prevented by the fear of exacerbating the 
conditions that feed terrorist acts. Alternatively, commercial inter-
ests and historical ties with specific countries have prevented the 
use of conditionality. Algeria stands as a powerful example. “Even 
though  elections  were  cancelled  in  Algeria  in  January  1992,  the Moschella: An IPE Approach to the Neighbourhood Policy  169 
Community and Member States only expressed concerns about the 
developments, and took no punitive action” (Smith 1998: 272). In 
general,  it  has  been  acknowledged  that  the  methodology  of  the 
Euro-Mediterranean  conditionality  in  supporting  social  and  eco-
nomic rights has been at best “uncertain” (Schmid 2004). 
 
If the Union has been so reluctant in applying conditionality, there 
are good reasons to question the argument that conditionality would 
find application in the neighbourhood. Fears of destabilization or 
commercial interests could prevent the Union from applying condi-
tionality in a similar way in which these factors have prevented the 
application of conditionality to its Mediterranean partners. Not only 
has  conditionality  been  problematic  in  its  application/non-
application. Where applied, its results have been mixed either. In 
the case of accession countries, Heather Grabbe (2002: 266) notes 
that EU conditionality may not “fit” the economic-political condi-
tions of some applicants – i.e. EU conditionality may divert national 
resources  from  developmental  objectives  and  thus  impairing  im-
plementation. Studying the effectiveness of EU policies in the area 
of democracy promotion, human rights, and the rule of law, Börzel 
and Risse (2004: 26-28) argue that the EU seems to follow “one 
single script”. The effectiveness of this single script, however, turns 
out to be highly dependent on the policy environment of the target 
country (Vachudova 2005). 
 
This brings us to the question of why and when is conditionality ef-
fective? Here, the insights developed within the IFIs may provide 
some guidance. The mixed record of IMF-World Bank programmes 
have sparked considerable debate and encouraged empirical studies 
that investigate the conditions under which external aid is effective. 
Despite the increasing scepticism about the capacity of IMF-World 
Bank  adjustment  programme  in  bringing  about  policy  change 
(Mosley, Harrigan, Toye 1995), authoritative studies have nonethe-
less drawn attention to some factors that facilitate this process. Spe-
cifically, two factors – national ownership and the quality of domes-
tic  policy  environment  –  seem  crucial  for  the  implementation  of 
agreed policy changes. 
 
First, ownership may be defined as “a willing  assumption of re-
sponsibility for an agreed program of policies”, by officials respon-170  European Political Economy Review  
   
sible for policy implementation (International Monetary Fund 2001: 
6). Empirical evidence shows that the likelihood of success for ad-
justment programmes is strongly related to the degree of ownership 
(for  a  review  of  the  empirical  literature:  Boughton,  Mourmouras 
2004). Second, the quality of the policy environment – i.e. institu-
tional capacity of the recipient country – increasingly appears to be 
a crucial variable for the implementation of IMF-World Bank pro-
grammes. There is solid evidence showing that while there is no 
general relationship between aid and growth and between aid and 
poverty reduction (World Bank 1997, 1998),
13 there is a positive re-
lationship in countries with good policy environment. Burnside and 
Dollar (1997, 1998) provide further empirical support to this posi-
tive relationship. Their main finding is that aid has no measurable 
effect on growth and poverty reduction in countries with poor pol-
icy regimes. By contrast, if aid interacts with a good score of the 
“economic management” index, aid results effective in achieving its 
goals. What does a good “economic management” score include? It 
includes sound macroeconomic policies (economic openness, fiscal 
order, and containment of inflation) and viable domestic institutions 
– as legal systems able to protect property rights and combat cor-
ruption and administrative systems able to implement new policies. 
 
The European neighbourhood policy seems having incorporated the 
insight  that  EU  incentives  are  effective  where  they  interact  with 
good  policy  environments.  That  is,  the  EU  recognizes  that  the 
causal  relationship  between  aid  and  domestic  change  is  complex 
and  spurious.  Aid  does  not  automatically  translate  into  policy 
changes unless the policy environment (legal, administrative, and 
political  capacity)  of  the  partner  country  is  ready  for  the  reform 
process. As the Commission (2003: 16) put it: “The EU should start 
from the premise that the institutions of state need to be capable of 
delivering full transition to comply with international political, legal 
and human rights standards and obligations”.  
 
There is considerable merit in the recognition of the importance of 
domestic factors in promoting domestic change – that is, in the rec-
ognition that policy change is mainly endogenous. However, this 
                                                 
13 Growth  and  poverty  reduction  are  the  “targets”  against  which  researchers 
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recognition also poses an interesting policy challenge for the inter-
national role of the EU. If partner countries that are not committed 
to policy change have incentives to renege on their commitments, 
and if the incentives offered by the EU are ultimately mediated by 
domestic factors, it may turn out that there is little room for EU in-
ternational influence. This problem does not exclusively apply to 
the EU. International official donors – governments and IFIs – face 
the same dilemma. What should international donors do with coun-
tries with severely distorted policy environments – that is, the most 
part of countries in need of help? In the case of the EU this question 
is even more pressing given the debate about the role of the EU as a 
“normative power” that refers to the capacity and the mechanisms 
through which the Union promotes policy change abroad (Manners 
2002; see contributions in Sjursen 2006). 
 
By accepting the notion that policy change is mainly an endogenous 
process, the EU seems to reposition itself as a promoter of domestic 
change. Rather than advocating thorough policy changes, the ENP 
suggests that the bulk of responsibility for the success of the process 
of policy reform lies in the neighbouring countries themselves (see 
also Tulmets, 2006). The implications of this repositioning are not 
necessarily negative though. By reducing expectations of EU’s in-
fluence – expectations on what the Union can achieve in the rela-
tionship with third countries – the EU may finally shrink the capa-
bility-expectations gap that has long been recognised as a burden on 
its external relationships (Hill 1993). In sum, rather than a worrying 
less  ambitious  international  role,  the  EU  places  itself  as  a  more 
pragmatic international actor. 
 
Beyond the implications for the role of the EU, the recognition that 
policy  change  is  mainly  endogenous  suggests  a  new  method  to 
study the EU and its relationship with third countries – as the ENP. 
Such a methodological implication calls for the adoption of an in-
ternational political economy (IPE) approach. 
 
4.2    An IPE approach to the ENP  
 
Analyses of EU external relationships have been mainly carried out 
from  two  different  perspectives.  The  first  privileges  the  interna-
tional level and focuses on the nature of the EU as an international 172  European Political Economy Review  
   
actor. In this perspective, analyses have been focused either on the 
features  of  EU  activities  beyond  its  border  (Bretherton,  Vogler 
2005) or on EU internal characteristics that are projected abroad. 
“[T]he most important factor shaping the international role of the 
EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Manners 
2002: 252).
14 The preponderant interest in the nature of the EU for-
eign policy has led some scholars to critically note that the crucial 
issue of assessing the impact of EU foreign policy has been rele-
gated to a residual status (Smith 2006: 326). 
 
Answering to this criticism, the second strand in the literature of EU 
foreign policy privileges exactly the impact of EU external relation-
ships by focusing on the domestic environment of the countries with 
which the EU establishes a relationship. For instance, drawing on 
the  experience  of  the  enlargement  process,  scholars  have  under-
taken a careful investigation of the domestic characteristics of the 
accession  countries  that  interact  with  EU  influence  in  promoting 
policy change (Grabbe 2001; Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004). 
Using the instruments of comparative politics, factors as the level of 
economic development, the structure of civil society, and the degree 
of political competition, have been thoroughly  disaggregated and 
investigated as factors able to account for domestic change (Vachu-
dova 2005). 
 
While both perspectives deserve credit, they fall short of disentan-
gling the relative weight of international and domestic variables in 
explaining domestic changes. As it has been noted:  
 
“In some countries, external and internal actors work in tandem to institute 
reforms […]. In others, external actors serve as a “push factor” in the re-
form process by either subtly “teaching” internal actors about the necessity 
of creating independent institutions or by playing a more determinative 
coercive role in pressing for institutional  innovation; and in still others, 
internal actors strategically use external actors to legitimate or make palat-
able to the populace their own reform goal” (Grabel 2003: 45)
15  
 
                                                 
14 For other examples of a conceptualization of the EU as an actor that external-
izes its internal governance see Bicchi (2006) and Lavenex (2004). 
15 About  the  IR  literature  on  the  role  of  external  actors  in  promoting  policy 
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In sum, by keeping separate the research agenda that studies EU ex-
ternal relationships, that is, by endorsing a division of labour be-
tween IR and comparative politics, we fail to appreciate the com-
plex interaction between the international and the domestic level.  
 
I thereby suggest adopting an international political economy ap-
proach. Indeed, an IPE approach is well-placed to bridge the divide 
between studies that focus on EU incentives, on the one hand, and 
studies that investigate domestic factors, on the other (for an IPE 
approach  to  bridge  the  divide  between  IR  and  governance  ap-
proaches, see Verdun 2003). 
 
Why is an IPE approach so well-placed? The IPE research agenda 
has long been in the forefront to investigate the interaction between 
the international and the domestic level to explore processes of pol-
icy continuities and changes.
16 The insights developed within this 
research agenda may usefully be applied to the study of the ENP by 
bringing in sharp relief factors that mediate between EU influence 
and domestic change. For instance, a sort of consensus has emerged 
among  comparative  political  economists  that  national  differences 
persist  despite  common  international  pressure  –  i.e.  globalization 
(Hall,  Soskice  2001;  Hollingsworth,  Boyer  1997;  Kitschelt  et  al. 
2000). Applying this argument to the EU integration process, Erik 
Jones (2003) notes that regional integration has not cancelled na-
tional idiosyncrasies. The common thread of these studies is that in-
stitutions matter. Then, a detailed investigation of what institutions 
and what mechanisms account for divergent policy outcomes have 
been fully explored. Extending these insights to the ENP may open 
interesting avenues for further research. Indeed, if we accept the ar-
gument that the principle of differentiation is one of the main fea-
tures of the neighbourhood policy, we cannot but appreciate the im-
portance of institutional factors.  
 
The EU has built the ENP on the assumption that national institu-
tions matter and that they will be crucial for policy reforms in line 
                                                 
16 The literature is huge and every reference is necessarily selective. Illustrious 
examples of IPE works that investigate policy change by integrating international 
and domestic factors are provided by Berman (1998), Helleiner (1994), MacNa-
mara (1998), Polanyi (1944). 174  European Political Economy Review  
   
with the ENP guidelines. Therefore, keeping on debating whether 
the incentives the EU offers to its neighbours are sufficient to bring 
about policy change may turn out to be a sterile debate. This debate 
does not offer a complete picture to understand the complex dy-
namic  between  international  and  domestic  factors  through  which 
policy change occurs. In contrast, elaborating on the insights devel-
oped by IPE scholars, as the insight on national distinctiveness, may 
provide well-developed theoretical toolkits and empirical cases to 
draw on to assess the potential influence of the ENP.  
 
The IPE approach supported here, then, is conceived as a substan-
tive contribution to the study of policy change rather than a meth-
odological contribution based on the application of economic mod-
els to political phenomena (Lake 2006). An IPE agenda to the study 
of the ENP will allow to appreciate the actual features of the policy. 
Doing justice to the ENP’s sensitivity to the importance of domestic 
institutional factors, an IPE approach offers a framework in which 
factors as the legacy of previous political regimes, political culture, 
political competition, government-society relationship, and bureau-
cratic quality may finally be integrated with international variables 
as the nature of EU incentives.  
 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
“[T]he EU is the world’s foremost example of regional integration, [it] has 
prided  itself  on  boosting  regionalism  elsewhere  in  the  world,  and  now 
claims to be supporting effective multilateralism everywhere. Not doing so 
in its own backyard seems a rather curious paradox” (Smith 2005: 772) 
 
That the European Union as the foremost example of regional inte-
gration  does  not  pursue  the  goal  of  regional  integration  in  its 
neighbourhood may well be considered a paradox. Nevertheless, the 
paradoxical argument cannot be equated with the negative argument 
prevalent in the literature on the ENP. In this paper, I argued that 
the scepticism associated with the neighbourhood policy – i.e. its 
ability to promote domestic change in the neighbouring countries – 
is  a  function  of  a  misleading  comparison  with  the  enlargement 
process. 
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Pointing to the flaws inherent in comparing the ENP and enlarge-
ment – because of their different finalité – I suggested comparing 
the  ENP  with  a  similar  neighbourhood  policy,  the  Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. By doing so, we can better identify the 
elements of continuity and change in the relationship between the 
EU and its neighbours. Drawing on the ENP-EMP comparison, I 
drew attention to the principle of differentiation as the main innova-
tion introduced by the ENP.  
 
Putting  the  European  Neighbourhood  policy  within  the  broader 
framework of the European Foreign Policy, the argument advanced 
here  has  been  that  the  ENP  does  not  constitute  a  revolutionary 
change  in  EU  external  relationships.  The  ENP  reflects  European 
traditional  foreign  policy  objectives  –  the  promotion  of  security, 
stability, and common values – and adopts EU traditional foreign 
policy instruments – promise of aid and economic integration. The 
ENP is innovative neither in its goals nor in its instruments. Never-
theless, it is its emphasis on differentiation that makes the ENP dis-
tinctive from past experiences. Shifting from the logic of policy-
change to policy-level, the EU redefines the mechanism of interac-
tion with its neighbours by recognizing the importance of domestic 
capabilities in bringing about policy change. 
 
Such a shift bears important implications both for the international 
role of the EU and for the method of studying EU external relation-
ships. On the one hand, the EU repositions itself as an international 
actor that promotes domestic change abroad. Specifically, it seems 
that the EU is cutting out for itself a lesser ambitious role that the 
one traditionally advocated. This repositioning should not be read in 
negative terms though. By reducing expectations about its capabili-
ties in influencing other states’ domestic policies, the EU may fi-
nally shrink the capability- expectations gap that has long been rec-
ognised as a burden on its external relationships. On the other hand, 
recognizing the complex interaction between international (e.g. EU 
incentives) and domestic (e.g. state institutions and state-society re-
lationship) factors, offers the possibility to reflect on the  way to 
study EU external relationships. In this respect, adopting an IPE ap-
proach, which has long been at the forefront to investigate the inter-
action between the domestic and the international dimension, may 
help bridge the divide in the scholarship that tends to focus either on 176  European Political Economy Review  
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